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JURISDICTION STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to UCA
§ 7S-2-2 &nd Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an action brought by Plaintiffs/Appellants to recover
compensatory and punitive damages against State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") for wrongfully, and in
bad faith, demanding subrogation monies from a wrongful death
settlement that was wholly inadequate to fairly compensate
Plaintiffs/Appellants for the loss of their children.

This is an appeal

from judgments entered on March 26, 1990, June 11, 1990 and the
Court's Minute Entry, dated February 7, 1990 by the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable David S.
Young presiding.

These judgments and orders became final by virtue

of the Court's judgment entered June 11, 1990 resolving all
remaining issues as to all remaining parties.
In the Minute Order, dated February 7, 1990, the Third Judicial
District Court, denied Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File a First
Amended Complaint [R. 278-287] to specifically allege independent
tort claims against State Farm.

The date of the District Court's non-

final Minute Order denying Appellants leave to amend this Complaint
is February 7, 1990.

This non-final order became final pursuant to

the Court's judgment entered on June 11, 1990 resolving all
remaining issues as to all remaining parties.
In the judgement, entered on March 26, 1990, the Third
Judicial District Court dismissed all claims of Appellant Hill for the
-1-

reason that Appellant Hill was not in privity of contract with State
Farm; further, the Court dismissed all punitive damage claims against
all Appellants for the reason that no independent tortious conduct
was alleged against State Farm.

In the judgement, entered on June

11, 1990, the Third Judicial District Court dismissed all remaining
claims against Appellant Caldwell.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues presented by this appeal are as follows:
a.

Whether material issues of fact exist to prove that State

Farm had no legal right to subrogation and reimbursement against
the Appellants1 settlement on the CUMIS policy.
b.

Whether naterial issues of fact exist to prove that the

acts and omissions of State Farm in causing CUMIS to withhold
subrogation and reimbursement payments were in bad faith.
c.

Whether Appellants' release of Bryan constituted

material breach of the insurance contract thereby entitling State
Farm to subrogation reimbursement as a matter of equity.
d.

Whether material issues of fact exist to place the burden

of proof on State Farm to prove that its subrogation demands against
Appellants were in fact accurate and in good faith.
e.

Whether Appellants' original complaint sets forth

adequate allegations of actionable bad faith conduct against State
Farm;
f.

Whether good cause and the interests of justice required

the District Court to grant leave for Appellants to file their first
amended

complaint;
.9 .

g.

Whether Appellant Hill has legal standing and injury to

assert an actionable bad faith claim against State Farm for its
violation of Utah's doctrine of "equitable subrogation"
h.

Whether Appellant Hill was in privity of contract

sufficient to assert an actionable bad faith claim against State Farm;
i.

Whether material issues of fact exist as to whether State

Farm is liable to Appellants for punitive damages for its bad faith
misconduct in pursuing subrogation and reimbursement from the
CUMIS policy and settlement.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES AND CASES
While the issues before the Court are fact intensive, the
statutes, rules and cases, inter alia, believed to be determinative uf
such issues are as follows:
1.

Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 480 P.2d
739 (Utah 1971).

2.

Transamerica Ins. Co. vs. Barnes. 505 P.2d 783 (Utah
1972).

3.

Hill and Caldwell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988).

4.

Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

5.

Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., Ill
(Utah 1988).

6.

Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 746 P.2d 1194 (Utah
App. 1987)

7.

Leigh Furniture and Carpet v. ham, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah
1982).

-3-

P.2d 325

8.

Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753
P.2d 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

9.

Westley v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93
(Utah 1983).

10.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(A)

Nature of the Case

This is an action brought by Plaintiffs/Appellants to recover
compensatory and punitive damages against State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company for wrongfully, and in bad faith,
demanding subrogation monies from a wrongful death settlement
that was wholly inadequate to fairly compensate
Plaintiffs/Appellants for the loss of their children.

(B)

Course of Proceedings

The Hills and Caldwells commenced this action seeking
payment of $5,510 and alleging bad faith against State Farm for its
pursuit of a subrogation claim against the settlement monies from
the tortfeasor's (Bryan) insurance company (CUMIS).

[R. 2-6]

In

-turn, State Farm filed a third-party claim against Bryan for
subrogation and indemnity; and State Farm counterclaimed against
Appellants for $5,510.

[R. 56-59]

State Farm filed a motion for

summary judgment on both Appellants1 complaints and on its own
counterclaim.

[R. 94-95]

The District Court granted the motion,

awarding State Farm $5,510, interest and attorney's fees.

The Court

also ruled that State Farm had no cause of action against Bryan.

-4-

[R.

135-138]

The Hills and Caldwells appealed the decisions of the

District Court.

[R. 139-141] The Supreme Court of Utah reversed the

District Court's granting of summary judgment and remanded the
case back to the District Court. Hill v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah, 1988). The Supreme Court held as
follows:
. . . we hold that in the absence of specific
contractual terms in either the release and
settlement or the insurance policy, the insured
must be made whole prior to any recovery by the
insurer against the tort-feasor. Where the insured
settles with the tort-feasor, the settlement amount
goes to the insured unless the insurer can prove
that the insured has already received full
compensation. [Id. at 869]
The Court went on to hold that the amount of the Appellants'
damages was a question of fact which had yet to be determined.

[Id.

at 868]

(C)

Disposition in the Court Below

After the remand of the case to the District Court, State Farm
tendered $5,510, plus accrued interest, to the Caldwells as full
relinquishment of its subrogation claim from the CUMIS settlement
monies.

[R. 217]

State Farm then moved for summary judgment

against Hill and for partial summary judgment on Appellants' claim
for punitive damages.

[R. 211-247]

Appellants moved the District

Court for leave to file their First Amended Complaint, which formally
added a tort cause of action against State Farm for interference with
contract and loss of economic relations. [R. 278-287]

-5-

The District

Court on March 26, 1990, granted State Farm's motion for summary
judgment against Hill and motion to dismiss punitive damages.

On

April 26, 1990, State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment to
dismiss all remaining claims against Caldwells.

[R. 352-355]

11, 1990, the District Court granted State Farm's motion.

On June

[R. 368-

369]
Appellants appeal the District Court's grant of summary
judgments in favor of State Farm, and they appeal the order of the
District Court in denying them leave to file their First Amended
Complaint.

(D)

Statement of the Facts

On June 6, 1982 Appellant Caldwell was the owner of an
automobile which was involved in a collision while being driven by
Appellant Caldwell's son, Troy.

Appellant Hill's daughter, Tamara,

was riding as a passenger in the vehicle.

The automobile accident

was with a vehicle driven by Kenneth Paul Bryan and the collision
resulted in the deaths of Appellant Caldwell's son and Appellant
Hill's daughter, both minors at the time.

[R. 2-6, 260-261]

On June 6, 1982 Appellant Caldwell owned an insurance policy
through State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company insuring
his automobile which was involved in the accident providing
coverage, among other things, for collision damage to the named
vehicle and PIP coverage.

[R. 2-6, 261]

On June 6, 1982 the vehicle involved in the accident being
driven by Kenneth Paul Bryan was insured by the CUMIS Insurance
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Society, Inc. The collision was caused by the negligence and
intoxication of Kenneth Paul Bryan.

[R. 2-6, 212]

As a proximate result of the accident, the 1979 Honda of
Appellant Caldwell was damaged in the sum of $5,510.00, which,
under the terms of Appellant's insurance contract with State Farm,
was paid for through his collision protection.

[R. 2-6]

The contract of insurance between Appellant Caldwell and
State Farm included a provision for recovery for his insured
automobile in the event of a collision which provided as follows:
Physical Damage Coverage Insuring Agreements,
Coverage G:
To pay for loss to the ^wned motor vehicle caused
by collision but only for the amount of each such
loss in excess of the deductible amount stated in the
declarations as applicable hereto. If the deductible
amount is $100 or less it shall not apply if the
collision is with another motor vehicle insured with
this company. [R. 212-213, 234]
The definitions contained in Section III of Appellant's
insurance contract with State Farm included the following:
Collision—means collision of a motor vehicle covered
by this policy with another object or with a vehicle
to which it is attached or upset of such motor
vehicle. [236]
* * * *

Loss—wherever used with respect to coverages D, F,
G, R and Rl, means each direct and accidental loss
of or damage to
(1)

an owned motor vehicle, or

-7-

(2)

its equipment.

Under coverages D, F, and G, loss includes direct and
accidental damage to wearing apparel and luggage.
Owner Motor Vehicle—Means the motor vehicle or
trailer described in the declarations, and includes a

temporary substitute automobile and a newlyacquired automobile.

IR. 213, 236]

Appellant Caldwell's State Farm insurance contract included a
provision for the recovery of Personal Injury Protection—no fault
benefits at paragraph 5 of the policy conditions, which states, in
pertinent

part:
5.
Trust Agreement—Coverages P [Personal
Injury Protection (P.I.P.)] and U. In the event of
payment to any person under coverage P or U:
(a)
The company shall be entitled to the
extent of such payment to the proceeds of any
settlement or judgment that may result from the
exercise of any rights of recovery of such person
against any person or organization legally
responsible for the bodily injury because of which
such payment is made;
(b) such person shall hold in trust for the
benefit of the company all rights of recovery which
he or she shall have against such other person or
organization because of the damages which are the
subject of claim made under the coverages; [R. 239]
[R. 259-270]

Appellant Caldwell received no-fault benefit payments through
his State Farm contract in the amount of $6,539.00, and Appellant
Hill received no-fault benefit payments through Caldwell's State
Farm contract in the amount of $6,120.00
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[R. 212]

Kenneth Paul Bryan was driving an automobile insured by the
CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc., with a singe limit liability insurance
coverage on the automobile in the amount of $50,000.00, which
amount was immediately tendered to Appellants Caldwell and Hill
($25,000.00 each) for the loss of their children.

[R. 213-214]

The wrongful deaths of the Appellant's children far exceeded in
value the sum of $25,000.00 per wrongful death, or a cumulative
total of $50,000 as insurance afforded by the CUMIS single limit
policy. [R. 273]
Appellants arrived at a reasonable compromise solution and
settlement with Kenneth Paul Bryan in the sum of the policy limits of
$50,000, but were unable to conclude their settlement of the
litigation because State Farm failed and refused to acknowledge that
there was insufficient insurance coverage to satisfy the entire claim
of the plaintiffs for the loss of their children; instead, State Farm
demanded that the sum of $5,510 in collision payment made to
Appellant Caldwell and the PIPS payments to Appellants be
reimbursed to State Farm out of the insurance policy liability limits
of Kenneth Paul Bryan. [R. 4-5, 262]
The State Farm insurance policy of Appellant Caldwell included
a condition regarding State Farm's right to subrogation which states,
in pertinent part:
Subrogation. Upon payment under this policy . . .
the company shall be subrogated to all the insured's
rights of recovery therefor and the insured shall do
whatever is necessary to secure such rights and do
nothing to prejudice them. [R. 212, 239]
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State Farm failed to join in the litigation and refused to
cooperate in settlement of the litigation by the plaintiffs for the
insufficient funds afforded by the CUMIS insurance coverage.

[R. 2-

6]
Appellants investigated the feasibility of litigation and possible
recovery against Kenneth Paul Bryan, independent of the insurance
coverage and determined that Kenneth Paul Bryan was insolvent.

[R.

5, 174, 175]
State Farm failed to investigate the feasibility of contingent
litigation and possible recovery against Kenneth Paul Bryan, or in the
alternative, knew that Kenneth Paul Bryan was essentially judgment
proof and insolvent.

[R. 2-6, 174, 175]

State Farm knew, or reasonably should have known, that the
liability insurance coverage by CUMIS afforded Kenneth Paul Bryan
was wholly inadequate to fully and fairly compensate Appellants for
the loss of their children.

[R. 2-6, 174, 175]

State Farm demanded of Appellants that the PIPS ($12,659.00)
and collision ($5,510.00) payments be subrogated and reimbursed to
State Farm from the corpus of the $50,000 settlement with CUMIS
and Kenneth Paul Bryan.

[R. 271-274, 174, 175]

It was necessary for Appellants to hire an attorney to deal with
State Farm relative to its claims for recovery of the PIP monies and
subrogation for the property damages.

[R. 271-274, 174, 175]

Only upon intercession by Appellants attorney did State Farm
determine not to further pursue recovery of the PIP monies.
271-274]
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[R.

The CUMIS policy, with a single liability limit of $50,000.00,
was not sufficient to satisfy Appellant's wrongful death claims.

[R.

271-274]
Appellant's attorney was told by the State Farm claims man for
the Appellant's claims, that if Appellants wished to prove that the
deaths of their children were worth $25,000.00 or more each,
Appellants would have to litigate the matter with the tortfeasor and
prove the children's worth to State Farm.

[R. 271-274]

Appellants' attorney made it clear to the State Farm claims
man that the costs of litigating the worth of the two children would
exceed the recovery claimed by State Farm.

[R. 271-274]

Appellants' attorney offered to let State Farm proceed with
subrogation at State Farm's cost; State Farm refused.

[R. 271-274]

Appellants, and their wives, signed separate releases in favor
of Bryan, CUMIS and others.

The release signed by Caldwell and his

wife recited consideration of $27,755 and specifically stated that
$5,510 of that recited consideration "represents damage to the
undersigned's automobile and that such amount will be made
payable by separate check to State Farm and Lorin D. Caldwell,
wherein a controversy exists between State Farm and Lorin D.
Caldwell as to who is entitled to the said amount, and that the matter
will be resolved between the two or by payment into court or by
judicial determination."

[R. 214-215]

The release signed by plaintiff Hill and his wife received
consideration of $22,245.00 and specifically state that:
It is understood that the above amount of twenty
two thousand two hundred and forty five and
-1 1-

no/100 Dollars ($22,245.00) represents twenty five
thousand and no/100 Dollars ($25,000.00) policy
limits less the collision claim of five thousand five
hundred ten and no/100 Dollars ($5,510.00) by
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, wherein a
controversy exists as to who is entitled to the said
amount, and that the matter will be resolved
between the two or by pay into court or by judicial
determination. [R. 262]
Since the Supreme Court decision in Hill and Caldwell v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile

Ins. Co., reversing summary judgment, State Farm has

paid the $5,510 plus interest to Caldwell.

[R. 217]

The only fact before the trial court since the Supreme Court decision
is that State Farm has finally, after nearly six (6) years, paid the contested
subrogation

claim.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Supreme Court remanded this case to determine
whether State Farm was warranted in its subrogation claim against
the settlement proceeds from the tortfeasor's insurance carrier,
CUMIS.

The Supreme Court made it clear that the insured (the

Caldwells and the Hills) must first be made whole prior to any
recovery by State Farm against the tortfeasor; the Court held that the
'settlement monies go to the insured unless the insurer can prove
that the insured has already received full compensation.

In the

instant case, the Court held that Appellants' damages are questions of
fact to be determined.
The trial court's grant of summary judgment on all of
Appellants' claims was improper and contrary to the directives of the
Supreme Court of Utah.

In spite of compelling evidence that the
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tortfeasor was insolvent and had wholly inadequate insurance
($25,000 per person) to compensate Appellants for the loss of their
two teenage children, the trial court improperly released State Farm
from its burden of proving that Appellants received full
compensation in spite of the fact that Appellants have alleged bad
faith conduct on the part of State Farm for knowingly interfering
with the settlement with the tortfeasor's carrier, and in spite of
compelling evidence that State Farm knowingly interfered with the
settlement after being placed on actual notice of the inadequate low
policy limits to compensate Appellants, the trial court improperly
relieved State Farm from accountability for its egregious conduct.

In

spite of the tortious conduct of State Farm in interfering with the
Appellants' settlement with the tortfeasor's carrier, the trial court
improperly relieved State Farm from punitive damage determination
by the trier of fact.
This Court should review the evidentiary record of this case
and determine that material issues of fact exist sufficient to allow the
trier of fact in this case to conclude that State Farm wrongfully, and
in bad faith, prosecuted a subrogation claim against CUMIS and
Appellants; that such wrongful conduct by State Farm was the
proximate cause of undue special and general damage to Appellants;
that relinquishment by State Farm, after the Supreme Court decision
in Hill and Caldwell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. of its
subrogation claim cannot purge the years of detriment suffered by
Appellants as a result of State Farm's bad faith; that material issues
of fact exist sufficient to allow the trier of fact to award punitive
damages against State Farm for its wrongful conduct.
-13-

The trial court erred in refusing to exercise its discretion to
allow Appellants to file a First Amended Complaint identifying the
tortious conduct of State Farm

as intentional interference with a

contract; the amendment presented no new material issue of fact nor
did it present any prejudice to State Farm.
The trial court erred in finding that Appellant Hill had no legal
standing to assert bad faith claim against State Farm.

Appellants

submit that material issues of fact exist to prove Hill was in privity
of contract with State Farm.

ARGLTMENT
POINT I:

MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST TO PROVE
THAT STATE FARM HAD NO LEGAL RIGHT TO
SUBROGATION AND REIMBURSEMENT
AGAINST APPELLANTS1 SETTLEMENT ON THE
CUMIS POLICY.

On November 17, 1983, Appellants filed a Complaint in Salt
Lake County, Third Judicial District Court [R. 2-6] seeking money
damages and punitive damages against State Farm on the grounds of
bad faith.

The thrust of Appellants' Complaint was that State Farm

was without any reasonable justification whatsoever in its ,
subrogation claim from the proceeds of the $50,000.00 policy limits
settlement for the tragic wrongful deaths of two Utah teenagers.

The

very heart of Appellants' original Complaint was the bad faith of
State Farm; to-wit:
12. That the above-named Plaintiffs arrived at a
compromise solution and settlement with the driver of
the vehicle causing said accident in the sum of the policy
limits of $50,000, but were unable to conclude their
-14-

settlement of the litigation because the above-named
Defendant failed and refused, and still refuses to
acknowledge that there was insufficient insurance
coverage to satisfy the entire claims of the Plaintiffs, and
has demanded that the sum of $5,510 in collision
payment make to Lorin Dean Caldwell be reimbursed to
the Defendant out of the insurance policy limits of the
driver of said vehicle causing said accident, [R. 4-5]
13. That Defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company failed to join in said
litigation and refused to cooperate in settlement of said
litigation by the Plaintiffs for the insufficient funds
afforded by the insurance coverage evidencing bad faith
toward its insureds in attempting to settle said litigation.
[Plaintiffs' Complaint, R. 5] (emphasis added)
Appellants went on to seek the following relief from the District
Court:
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that the Defendant be
required to endorse said check payable to the Plaintiffs
for the $5,510.00 remaining unpaid on the death claim of
the Plaintiffs as personal representatives of said minor
decedents, that Plaintiffs recover their attorney's fees in
a reasonable sum to be determined by the court herein,
together with punitive damages for bad faith in
obstructing settlement of Plaintiffs' claim against a tort
feasor and causing unnecessary litigation where it is
obvious that the insurance coverage afforded by the tort
feasor's vehicle was inadequate to satisfy said death
claims, together with Plaintiffs' costs of suit incurred
herein, and such other and further relief as the Court
deems proper in the premises. [Plaintiffs' Complaint, R.
5-6] (emphasis added)
The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged Appellants' claim in Hill, et
al v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 765 P.2d 864, 865 (Utah
1988):

-15-

Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendant, arguing
that numerous triable issues of fact exist and
claiming bad faith, (emphasis added)
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment against plaintiffs.

In

reversing the summary judgment, the Supreme Court unequivocally
placed the burden on State Farm to justify its subrogation claim from
the settlement proceeds:
. . . State Farm's only recourse is to show either that
plaintiffs were fully compensated and thus State
Farm is entitled to be reimbursed from Bryan's
insurance policy proceeds or that plaintiffs1 action
in releasing Bryan breached the insurance policy,
and if State Farm shows it could have recovered
from Bryan, it will be entitled to the proceeds as a
matter of equity. [Id. at 869]
On remand to the District Court, State Farm made no effort to
meet that burden.
of this case.

It is obvious that it could not under the clear facts

The uncontroverted, unimpeached and unassailable

facts of this case is that $25,000 for Appellant Hill's teenage
daughter, Tamara Hill, was wholly inadequate compensation for her
wrongful death; and that $25,000 for Appellant Caldwell's son, Troy
Caldwell, was wholly inadequate compensation for his wrongful
death.

(See Lauchnor Affidavit R 2-6; Hill deposition R. 175 at page

46, line 2; Caldwell deposition R. 174 at page 32, line 15, page 34,
line 16.)
After the Supreme Court decision, it is clear that State Farm
very much wanted this case to go away.

It tendered full

reimbursement of the claimed subrogated monies of $5,510, together
with accrued interest.

[R. 217]

State Farm then moved for summary

-16-

judgment claiming that the case was over.
contend that the case should not be over.

Appellants protest and
The issues of State Farm's

unwarranted acts and omissions, and bad faith over these long years
cannot simply be eliminated by tender of a few thousand dollars in
the face of the losses and damages suffered by Appellants.
Both the original Complaint [R. 2-6] and proposed First
Amended Complaint [R. 280-287] of Appellants make clear what
economic hardships and emotional losses that State Farm's
unwarranted claim of subrogation from the proposed $50,000
settlement caused them; to-wit:
(1)

for a unreasonable period of time, the
Appellants wert needlessly without their
rightful settlement monies;

(2)

for a unreasonable period of time, Appellants
had to assume a senseless legal and
economical burden to hire a lawyer to fight
for their rightful claim to the full settlement
monies from CUMIS; a fight that required
grief-stricken and devastated parents to file a
lawsuit and ultimately take their case to the
Supreme Court of Utah to vindicate their
rights;

(3)

At the time State Farm was pursuing the
subrogation claims, Appellant Hill was not
financially strong. He did not have any
savings and, for a period of time after the
accident, was totally incapable of working. He
had to take handouts from others to keep his
family going. The severe emotional impact of
the death of his daughter was a surprise to
him which he did net anticipate. [R. 175, page
14, line 7]
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Appellants contend that the Utah Supreme Court remanded this
case to the District Court to address not only the issue of whether
State Farm was entitled to withhold the alleged subrogation monies
of $5,510 from the proceeds of the CUMIS settlement of $50,000, but
to address the issues of whether State Farm's refusal to relinquish its
subrogation claims from the CUMIS settlement was in bad faith, and
what injuries and damages did Appellants suffer as a result of State
Farm's bad faith.
POINT II:

MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST TO PROVE
THAT STATE FARM'S ACTS AND OMISSIONS
IN CAUSING CUMIS TO WITHHOLD
SUBROGATION AND REIMBURSEMENT
PAYMENT CONSTITUTE ACTIONABLE BAD
FAITH.

In addressing the subrogation issue, the Supreme Court made
the following determination:
In the case now before the Court, the insurer's
right to subrogation was set forth in the insurance
policy. Unfortunately, the record does not reveal
the extent of the subrogation terms, nor does it
provide a complete copy of the insurance policy.
We are thus unable to ascertain the intent of the
parties as to the extent of their respective rights
under the subrogation clause. Therefore, the
doctrine of subrogation should be applied in this
case according to general principles of equity.
Nothing that State Farm has adduced on remand alters the
application of equitable subrogation principles to the circumstances
of this case.

The insurance policy is now a part of the record of this

case [R. 225-247]; the subrogation clause states in pertinent part:
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Subrogation. Upon payment under this policy . . .
the company shall be subrogated to all the insured's
rights of recovery therefor and the insured shall do
whatever is necessary to secure such rights and do
nothing to prejudice them.
Such vague language merely establishes a general right of State Farm
to subrogation.

It does not contain express terms to reverse the

equitable subrogation principles established in Lyon v.
Accident

and Indemnity

Hartford

Co., 480 P.2d 739 (Utah 1971) that the

insured must be made whole prior to any recovery by the insurer
against the tortfeasor.

In fact, the subrogation clause in the instant

case is identical to the one in Lyon,

to-wit:

. . . the company shall be subrogated to all the
rights of recovery therefor which the injured
person or anyone receiving such payment may
have against any person or organization and such
person shall execute and deliver instruments and
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure
such rights. Such person shall do nothing after loss
to prejudice such rights. [Id. at 744]
Notwithstanding the subrogation clause, the Supreme Court in

Lyon

stated:
In the instant action, there are no terms in
this general subrogation clause which would
support Hartford's subrogation claim to the $2,000,
while plaintiff remains uncompensated for her total
damages. [Id. at 745]
The Court went on to apply the same equitable principles of
subrogation as did the Court in Hill and Caldwell v. State Farm
Insurance

Company,

damages in Lyon

765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988).

As the plaintiffs

exceeded the applicable policy limits, the Court

observed that there was no double recovery by the injured party.
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[Id. at 744] (See, also, Transamerica Insurance Company v.

Barnes,

505 P.2d 783 (Utah 1972).)
The Supreme Court in Hill and Caldwell v. State Farm Insurance
Company

echoed the equitable principles of subrogation set forth in

Lyon:
. . . where the language of the release leaves the
allocation uncertain and where there is no
controlling contractual language to the contrary, the
insured should be given the benefit of the doubt as
to its damages and the burden will rest with the
insurer to prove that the insured has been fully
compensated. [Id. at 868] (emphasis added)
Accordingly, the burden is on State Farm to prove that both the Hills
and Caldwells have been fully compensated by virtue of the CUMIS
settlement of $25,000 for each death.

The record is devoid of any

evidence submitted by State Farm to meet its burden; to the
contrary, the compelling evidence in the record is that the CUMIS
insurance proceeds were wholly inadequate to fully compensate
Appellants for loss of their children.
Regardless of whether or not Appellants are entitled to pursue
punitive damages against State Farm, it is clear that State Farm owed
Appellants an implied good faith and fair dealing obligation.
Farmers

Insurance

Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

Beck v.

The

evidence adduced by Appellants' legal counsel, Wallace R. Lauchnor,
demonstrates material issues of fact exist as to whether State Farm
breached this obligation in several different regards; to-wit:
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(1)

2.
On or about February 1, 1983
Lorin Dean Caldwell and Robert Kent and
Janet Hill came to me to see if they could
obtain some help, after Mr. Hill and Mr.
Caldwell were informed by State Farm that
they would not permit them to accept
settlement of insurance monies from CUMIS
without litigation unless State Farm's claim
for subrogation was honored by a payment to
State Farm for their collision loss. The State
Farm adjuster or claims manager also wanted
to withhold from the payment the money
paid under PIP no fault. [Lauchnor affidavit,
R. 272]

(2)
State Farm persisted in pursuing the
subrogation claim even after being notified that it
was not entitled to it under Utah law:
4.
On several occasions I contacted
State Farm's claims man and discussed the
matter with him, bringing to his attention the
fact that under the Utah case law he was not
entitled to claim any subrogation on the PIP
payments. [Lauchnor affidavit, R. 272]
(3) That State Farm not only intentionally refused
to relinquish their claims, but took the position that
the Hills and Caldwells would have to prove that
the deaths of two high school students were worth
more than $25,000.00 each by going to the expense
of filing a lawsuit and senselessly getting a large
judgment against an insolvent defendant (Bryan):
8.
I again contacted State Farm's
claims man but was told that they would not
relinquish their claim under any
circumstance. He made it very clear to me
that if we wished to prove that the deaths of
the two high school students were worth
$25,000 or more each, the Hills and Caldwells
would have to litigate the matter with the
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tortfeasor and prove to him that this be the
case. [Lauchnor affidavit, R. 273]
(4) That State Farm persisted in their wrongful
conduct even after being advised that such
litigation was not economically or emotionally
warranted for the Hills and Caldwells:
9.
I made it very clear to the State
Farms claims man that the amount involved
would not warrant either Mr. Hill or Mr,
Caldwell spending such money to hire counsel,
as the attorney's fees and court costs would
exceed the recovery being claimed by State
Farm. I further pointed out that the insureds
were going to end up spending more money
to try to prove State Farm's claim of
subrogation than the claim was worth, and
that this simply was unjust. [Lauchnor
affidavit, R. 273-274]
(5) That State Farm refused when offered the
opportunity to proceed with subrogation if it would
pay for the costs and legal fees:
10, I also then offered to let State
Farm proceed with subrogation and pay their
own counsel if they so desired but felt it was
grossly unfair to expect the insured and Mr.
Hill to foot the bill for this litigation where the
money had already been offered by the
tortfeasor's carrier. He nevertheless refused
to acquiesce in any of these suggestions.
[Lauchnor affidavit, R. 274]
To allow State Farm to escape responsibility for such egregious
and unfair dealings with its insureds by simply tendering $5,510,
plus interest, on remand is not the proper message to send an
insurance carrier in State Farm's shoes.

It tells the carrier that it can

be wholly unreasonable for years and years toward its insured, and
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hope that the insured will capitulate in the face of such behavior, and
if they don't capitulate, tender the money years down the road after
substantial damage and hardship to the insureds has been done.

It is

Appellants 1 contention that the public policy of Utah will not permit a
carrier to do these things with impunity.

The carrier must be held

accountable.
POINT i n : APPELLANTS' ORIGINAL COMPLAINT STATES
AN ACTIONABLE CLAIM AGAINST STATE
FARM FOR BOTH BAD FAITH AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGES; GOOD CAUSE AND THE INTERESTS
OF JUSTICE REQUIRED THE TRL\L COURT TO
GRANT APPELLANTS' LEAVE TO FILE THEIR
AMENDED COMPLAINT.
As stated above, Appellants contend that the original Complaint
sufficiently plead bad faith against State Farm.

The purpose of the

proposed First Amended Complaint was not only to plead in greater
factual detail, but to also make more specific the tortious conduct of
State Farm for purposes of the punitive damages claim against State
Farm.

[R. 278-287, 313-316]
Count II of Appellants' First Amended Complaint was for

intentional interference with contract and economic relations.
.285-286]

[R.

The evidenciary allegations supporting those torts were

essentially the same evidenciary allegations plead in Appellants'
original Complaint.

The purpose of the First Amended Complaint was

to clarify Appellants 1 legal position on punitive damages to
correspond with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Beck v.
Farmers

Insurance

Exchange. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

State Farm argued that amendments after remand should not
have been allowed as they were inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's ruling.
authority:

In support thereof, State Farm cites for its only

H

6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,

§ 1498, which states, in part:
'Once the case has been remanded, the lower court
will permit new issues to be presented by an
amended pleading that is consistent with the
judgment of the appellant court/"
Such quote was horribly taken out of context; Wright & Miller
actually states:
Although amendments to the original pleadings
generally may not be made once the suit has
reached the appellate level, if the court of appeals
determines that the lower court impliedly tried the
case on a theory not set forth in the pleadings, it
may permit a conforming amendment—in effect
under Rule 15(b) (or at least by analogy to it)—to
include that theory in the trial record. More
importantly, if the appellate court decides that the
district court abused its discretion in refusing to
allow an amendment, or did not give a party a
sufficient opportunity to cure the defects in his
pleadings and state a claim for relief, it may
remand the case with directions to allow the
appellant to amend. Once the case has been
remanded, the lower court will permit new issues
to be presented bv an amendment pleading that is
consistent with the judgment of the appellate court.
[Id. at §1498] (emphasis added)
While the consistency or inconsistency of the Supreme Court's
judgment in the instant case is not relevant to whether Appellants
should be allowed to amend their Complaint, the amendment sought
is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's ruling.
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The Supreme Court's actual judgment in Hill v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile

Insurance

Company, 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988),

was that "Summary Judgment in favor of State Farm on Plaintiffs'
Complaints and on State Farm's counterclaim is reversed."
Appellants' Complaint sets forth all the requisites of the tort
claim for interference with economic relations.

To state a claim for

intentional interference with economic relations, the plaintiff must
show:
(1) That the defendant intentionally interfered
with the plaintiffs' existing or potential economic
relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by
improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff,
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isam,
657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982)
All that the proposed First Amended Complaint seeks to do is
give a name to the tortious conduct of State Farm consistent with
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isam. It did not specifically claim
relief based on intentional interference with economic relations.
amendment sought clearly asks for >uch relief.

[R. 313-316]

The

The

proposed amendment presents no new factual issues in the case and
in no way prejudiced State Farm or served to expand discovery or
delay the prosecution of the action.

The interests of justice justified

the District Court in permitting the filing of the First Amended
Complaint.

Rule 15(a) U.R.C.P.

To rule otherwise under the

circumstances of this case was an abuse of discretion.

Lloyd's

Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988); Westley v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 663 P.2d 93
(Utah 1983).
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While Appellants' original Complaint did not, however, AT
specifically claim for relief based upon intentional interference with
economic relations, the material allegations and elements of the tort
claim were indeed included in the Complaint.

For example, the

original Complaint specifically alleges that Appellants "were unable
to conclude the wrongful death settlements because [State Farm]
failed and refused, and still refuses to acknowledge that there were
insufficient insurance coverage to satisfy the entire claims of
plaintiffs. . . ."

[Complaint, R. 5, paragraph 12] The Complaint goes on

to specifically allege that State Farm "refused to cooperate in the
settlement of said litigation by the plaintiffs for the insufficient
funds afforded by the insurance coverage evidencing the bad faith
toward its insureds in attempting to settle this litigation.

[Complaint,

R. 5, paragraph 13]
Appellants claim punitive damages arising from the intentional
interference alleging that State Farm's actions were malicious or
were taken with wanton disregard for Appellants' rights.
268]

[R. 267-

Appellants contend such allegations, together with the evidence

of record in the instant action, is sufficient for the trier of fact to
award punitive damages.

Beck v. Farmers Insurance

Co., 701 P.2d

795 (Utah 1985).
While State Farm claims that Beck does not provide for
punitive damages in a First Party bad faith case, the Court of Appeals
(per Judges Greenwood, Bench and Billings) in Gagon v. State Farm
Mutual Auto Insurance

Co., 746 P.2d 1194 (Utah App. 1987),

reversed and remanded a district court directed verdict in a First
Party bad faith action.

As part of his appeal, plaintiff Gagon claimed
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that the district court improperly excluded evidence of punitive
damages and consequentual damages, including attorney's fees.

The

court found no error in such exclusion for the reason that the parties
had stipulated, and the district court had agreed, to exclude evidence
of punitive damages until the jury had found State Farm had acted in
bad faith.

The court concluded its opinion with the statement that:
If lack of good faith is found on remand,
consideration of punitive damages and
consequentual damages will be appropriate.
[Id. at 1197]

In Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., Ill

P.2d 325

(Utah 1988), State Farm's petition for certiorari was denied without
opinion by the Supreme Court alihough Justice Zimmerman provided
a concurring opinion, which opinion was quoted at length by
Defendant in its brief.

The concurring opinion is little more than a

brief recitation of that part of the Beck opinion which held that a
plaintiff was not entitled to put on punitive damage evidence unless
the plaintiff could make a sufficient case to go to the jury on an
independent tort theory.

What is, perhaps, more notable is the fact

that a majority of the Court did not join in Justice Zimmerman's
affirmance of that portion of Beck.
the Gagon

Appellants assert that based on

opinions, the Supreme Court considers that punitive

damages are "appropriate" for "lack of good faith" in First Party
actions.
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POINT IV: APPELLANT HILL HAS LEGAL STANDING TO
ASSERT A BAD FAITH CLAIM AGAINST STATE
FARM; HILL WAS IN PRIVITY OF CONTRACT
WITH STATE FARM.
Appellants complain of State Farm's actions in its wrongful
attempts to enforce the subrogation and Trust Agreement provisions
of the State Farm automobile policy.

It is essential to recognize that

State Farm first attempted to recover not only the monies it paid to
Caldwell for property damage but also the monies it paid to Hill and
Caldwell for P.I.P.

[Lauchnor Affidavit, R. 292-273, paragraphs 2-5]

It cannot be seriously argued but that State Farm was in privity of
contract with Hill as to the recovery of P.I.P. monies under the "Trust
Agreement" contract conditions.

State Farm paid Hill the sum of

$6,120 for P.I.P no fault benefits.

While State Farm now asserts that

it stepped into the shoes of Caldwell only in pursuing the subrogation
claim for property damage, such contention is fatally flawed and
must fail for the reality is State Farm's subrogation claim worked as
a detriment to Hill in that he would ultimately receive less money
from the settlement with CUMIS in that the release signed by
Appellant Hill and his wife recited consideration of $22,345, and
specifically

stated:
It is understood that the above amount of twenty
two thousand two hundred and forty five and
no/100 Dollars ($22,245.00) represents twenty five
thousand and no/100 Dollars ($25,000.00) policy
limits less the collision claim of five thousand five
hundred ten and no/100 Dollars ($5,510.00) by
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, wherein a
controversy exists as to who is entitled to the said
amount, and that the matter will be resolved
between the two or by pay into court or by judicial
determination.
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Although State Farm restricts Appellants' complaints of bad
faith to its refusal to waive its subrogation claim, such restriction is
not accurate.

Appellants' foremost bad faith complaint with State

Farm arises out of State Farm's total failure to investigate whether
the low limit CUMIS insurance monies were sufficient to satisfy
Appellants' wrongful death claims.
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985)
concluded that:
. . . the obligation of good faith performance
contemplates at the very least, that the insurer will
diligently investigate the facts to enable it to
determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly
evaluate the claim, and will thereafter act promptly
and reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim.
The duty of good faith also requires the insurer . . .
to refrain from actions that will injure the insured's
ability to obtain the benefits of the contract,
(citations omitted) (emphasis added)
The record is devoid of any evidence whatsoever that State Farm
reasonably investigated whether (1) the CUMIS proceeds were
sufficient to satisfy Appellants' wrongful death claims, (2) State
Farm's claim for subrogation was in fact valid under Utah law given
the doctrine of "equitable subrogation," and (3) Appellants' claim that
State Farm was not entitled to subrogation or repayment of P.I.P.
benefits was valid.
Appellants assert that any reasonable investigation would
show (a) that the $50,000.00 CUMIS policy was not sufficient to
satisfy the Appellants' wrongful death claims but in fact was wholly
inadequate; [R. 271-274] (b) that Appellants' attorneys had
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conducted investigations to determine the same matters; [R. 271274] and (c) that Appellants' attorneys had useful and valid
information that State Farm could use in its investigation and in
making its evaluations [R. 271-274],
On the contrary, State Farm arbitrarily rejected Appellants'
claims and upheld its own claims without any reasonable
investigation of facts necessary to make fair evaluations and
decisions.

Based upon its conduct in continuing to assert the

subrogation and P.I.P. reimbursement claims, State Farm's
determinations were as follows:
(1)

Appellants' wrongful death claims were satisfied by

the CUMIS payment of $50,000.00; that is to say Appellants
were made whole for the wrongful death of two (2)
outstanding children by the total payment of $50,000.00.
(2)

Because Appellants' claims were satisfied by the

payment of $50,000.00, State Farm was entitled to satisfy its
claim for subrogation as to the $5,510.00 paid to Caldwell for
damage to his property, and State Farm was entitled to
reimbursement from Caldwell and Hill for P.I.P. payments in
the sum of $12,659.00 under the trust agreement provisions of
the Caldwell contract.
(3)

Appellants' claim that State Farm was not entitled

to subrogation or repayment of P.I.P. benefits should be
rejected.
(4)

The legal burden and duty was upon grief-stricken

and devastated parents to file a lawsuit, relive the worst days
of their lives and take that suit to judgment to show State Farm
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that the wrongful deaths of two outstanding teenage children
were worth more than $25,000.00 each.
(5)

State Farm had no duty or burden to investigate

whether its subrogation and trust agreement claims were good
claims under Utah law given the unrefutable facts of this case.
(6)

State Farm could enforce its claimed rights to

subrogation and recovery of the P.I.P. monies as such actions
would not injure the insured's ability to obtain the benefit of
the insurance contract.
POINT V:

[R. 262-266]

STATE FARM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IS PREMATURE; APPELLANTS
WOULD BE ALLOWED A REASONABLE TIME IN
WHICH TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY.

Although Appellants filed this lawsuit some years ago, little
time has been available for discovery.
filed on November 18, 1983.

This matter was originally

Defendant's first motion for summary

judgment was filed on September 12, 1984, and was granted by the
trial court on October 22, 1984.

A lengthy appeal followed with final

disposition on November 1, 1988.

Following the decision on appeal,

Appellants unsuccessfully attempted settlement of this matter.

On

May 4, 1989, State Farm filed another motion for summary
judgment.

At the same time, Mr. Lauchnor, Appellants' original

attorney in this matter, determined that he would most likely be a
witness and would have to withdraw as counsel.

[R. 292-294]

State

Farm has filed its latest motion for summary judgment based on the
same facts found insufficient to support summary judgment the first
time

around.
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Judicial economy and the interest of justice will be better
served if Appellants are allowed leave to file their First Amended
Complaint and time to complete discovery.

CONCLUSION
On the same facts and evidence that Appellants rely on in this
appeal, the Utah Supreme Court in Hill and Caldwell v. State Farm
Mutual Insurance

Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah, 1988) held that State

Farm must show that [Appellants] were either fully compensated or
that Appellants' action in releasing Bryan breached the insurance
policy entitling State Farm to subrogation reimbursement as a matter
of equity.

State Farm has proved neither; material issues of fact on

these questions, together with Appellants bad faith claims, iustifv a
trial on the merits.
The Hills and Caldwells remain uncompensated for the money
losses that State Farm's unwarranted subrogation claims have caused
them; losses that include the attorney fees of Wallace Lauchnor, the
economic loss that State Farm's interference with the CUMIS
settlement caused them and the emotional and mental anguish State
Farm's bad faith caused them.

This long ordeal of the Hills and

Caldwells can not be allowed to end by State Farm's relinquishment
of the subrogation claim after the irreparable damage to the
Appellants had been done.
Appellants respectfully

submit that the summary judgments

above be reversed; the District Court's denial of Appellant's motion
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for leave to file their First Amended Complaint be reversed; and the
case be remanded for a trial of all causes of action.
DATED this 31st day of March, 1991.
Respectfully submitted,

(QY/AjlACOBXON, JR/ [A4480]
1265-^ull Rake Drive
Jackson, Wyoming 83001
(307) 733-7290
Attorney for Plaintiffs and Appellants
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